Are Theodicies Possible? (Yes)
My EPS Paper on God, Evil, and Transcendental Arguments
Here’s my outline for the paper presentation I gave at the 2023 Evangelical Philosophical Society meeting at ETS in San Antonio, Texas. The paper is a work in progress. Here’s the abstract and following it is the link to watch my presentation. You can follow along with the outline as you watch by opening the YouTube video in a new tab. It’s pretty technical but for those interested, I hope you enjoy, and if you have feedback then let me know:
Abstract: Sami Pihlström proposes a transcendental argument against the possibility of offering a successful theodicy on behalf of God. He argues that if any theodicy were successful, then we wouldn’t be able to adopt a moral point of view, but since we actually do occupy a moral point of view, no theodicy can possibly be successful. In this paper, I argue that Pihlström’s transcendental argument fails because it crucially depends on one demonstrably false premise and another highly questionable premise. I then propose a counter-transcendental argument whereby the possibility of adopting a moral point of view presupposes moral realism, which in turn is best explained by theism, thus also lending support to the possibility of successful theodicies.
Tackling Pihlström’s Transcendental Anti-Theodicy
Transcendental Arguments(TA):
(TA) transcendental argument = df. an argument that proceeds from a given aspect of human experience, X, to a necessary precondition (or presupposition) Y, which makes X possible (or intelligible).
Pihlström’s Transcendental Anti-Theodicy (TAT)
(1) Adopting a moral point of view on other human beings (or the world in general) is possible only if others’ suffering (or their experiences of suffering, or the truthful communication of such experiences) is recognized (or acknowledged).
(2) Recognizing (acknowledging) the other’s suffering presupposes that suffering sincerely experienced as meaningless and/or absurd is not explained away or justified in terms of any externally imposed (e.g., narrative) structure of meaningfulness.
(3) Theodicies justify, or explain away, (all) suffering as part of an externally imposed, allegedly harmonious (either theological or secular) total narrative, thus giving suffering a meaning or function not manifested—and not recognized—in the experience of suffering.
(4) Therefore, theodicies do not enable us to recognize (acknowledge) others’ suffering. In particular, they fail to recognize the sufferer’s inability to recognize any meaning or function in her/his suffering.
(5) Therefore, theodicies prevent us from adopting (occupying) a moral point of view.
(6) It is possible for us to adopt a moral point of view (because we actually do so).
(7) Therefore, theodicies must be rejected (not only for moral but for transcendental reasons.[1]
Contra (3): PVI’s “The Magnitude, Duration, and Distribution of Evil”[2]
(3)*: most theodicies justify, or explain away, (all) suffering as part of an externally imposed, allegedly harmonious (either theological or secular) total narrative, thus giving suffering a meaning or function not manifested—and not recognized—in the experience of suffering.
(3)** There is a type of theodicy which justifies, or explains away, (all) suffering as part of an externally imposed, allegedly harmonious (either theological or secular) total narrative, thus giving suffering a meaning or function not manifested—and not recognized—in the experience of suffering.
Contra (ii): one can recognize another person’s suffering while still seeking to justify it in terms of an externally imposed structure of meaningfulness (e.g. a father justifies the suffering of a rabies shots to his daughter). In fact, there are cases in which the recognition of someone’s suffering actually compels us to provide such a meaningful explanation if we can do so. So then, premise (ii) of TAT is at best a mistaken moral principle and at worst it begs the question against the possibility of an accurate theodicy.
Transcendental Pro-theodicy argument (TPT):
8. If God exists, then God would have a morally sufficient reason for the suffering that humans experience.
9. If MR, then God exists (as the best explanation of or necessary presupposition of
MR).
10. If TAT is intelligible then MR.
11. TAT is intelligible (even though false).
12. MR (from c & d)
13. God exists (from b & e)
Therefore,
14. God has a morally sufficient reason for the suffering that humans experience. (from a & f).
[1] Sami Pihlström, “Transcendental Anti-Theodicy” in Transcendental Arguments in Moral Theory, eds. Jens peter Brune, Robert Stern, Micha H. Werner (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter GmbH, 2017), 305.
[2] Peter van Inwagen, “The Magnitude, Duration, and Distribution of Evil: A Theodicy” in Philosophical Topics, Fall 1988, Vol. 16. No. 2, 161-187.