Is Water Wet or Does It Just Make Things Wet? (Analytic Metaphysician Explains)
Dr. Robert Garcia Changed My Mind About Water's Wetness in a Just a Few Text Messages
What is public-facing philosophy? It’s philosophy, done seriously, but expressed in a way that non-specialists—the public—can understand, and ideally, can benefit from. Additionally, I think public-facing philosophy should probably address issues that abstract thinkers outside of the academy like to ponder on. At its best, public-facing philosophy demonstrates the tools of the academy in a way that helps abstract thinkers outside of the academy think about a topic more clearly, and it will perhaps even lure such folks deeper into academic philosophy simpliciter.
Public-facing philosophy can include very serious and important work like helping legislators get clear on the words and phrases they use in the laws they’re proposing. It can also include really fun and kind of quirky work, like helping settle the debate about whether water itself is wet, or if it just makes other things wet.
I’ve been asked about the ‘wetness’ of water many times. It’s one of those popular level philosophy questions that makes its rounds and often ends in manic shouting matches. Yes, it’s goofy, but it’s actually a fascinating question and I think the frustration arises from lacking the tools to effectively articulate one’s own position. When the conversation can’t progress past the level of raw intuitions, the disagreement devolves into a shouting match instead of a dispassionate argument. It’s fun to roast your buddies for their dumb views, but it’s also fun to show them why they’re so wrong or go tit for tat in a well-reasoned debate.
So, for the sake of harmony, and the good of your friend group, I want to elevate the conversation and give you some tools to settle the debate—or at least to get a little more clear on what the argument is about.
Now, I thought I had settled my own view on whether water is wet or not and I was about to write up a post on it, but I figured I should check with one of my favorite analytic metaphysicians, Dr. Robert Garcia, first. He changed my mind in like three text messages. So, instead of writing up the piece I was going to write, let me just show you our quick text thread. And let me hedge a little, this was just off the top of his head, I don’t know if he’s willing to die on this hill or present it at the next APA conference—it’s a response to a text I sent him at like 10pm haha. However, I do think he’s right and he’s changed my mind. Water is wet!
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Okay, now here’s how Dr. Robert Garcia changed my mind about water being wet:
Is Water Wet?
Parker: Hey Dr. Garcia, random question, if you have time, if not, no worries. Is water wet? I'm writing up a post on it and I'm inclined to say no. Water makes things wet. Fire is hot and makes things hot but fire burns things and is not itself burnt. That second sense is how I'm thinking of water and wetness. Water is analogous to a modifier trope or a non-exemplifying property. Am I missing something obvious?
[Park note on tropes: a ‘trope’ in this discussion is not a literary or rhetorical device—not a reoccurring theme— but is instead a term of art in metaphysics (metaphysics being a subfield of philosophy that studies reality). A ‘trope’, in the philosophical sense, is a particular way of explaining properties. Two basketballs are orange. How do we explain both balls having the same property? Do they both exemplify the same universal ‘orange’? Are they both instantiations of orangeness? The trope theorist says that they both have their own particular orange trope (an orangeness-trope) and this explains their similarity, instead of pointing to some universal that they both participate in. See this Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy entry on Tropes, for more, and welcome to the rabbit hole. Modifier tropes are tropes that modify the objects they inhere in. But while the modifier trope causes the object to have its property or explains how the object has it, the modifier trope itself doesn’t exemplify the property it gives or causes in the object —modifier tropes are not “self-exemplifying”. Module tropes are self-exemplifying. So maybe a heat trope causes a pan to be hot, but the heat trope itself is also hot—this would be a module trope since it is self-exemplifying. I know it’s weird. Philosophy is weird. But it’s fun and ends up being important too. Dr. Garcia is an expert on trope theory, check out his website here and his quick blurb on these kinds of tropes here.]
Robert Garcia: Fun question - thanks for asking! The key question, of course, is what do we mean by ‘wet’? One standard and plausible definition of wet is “covered or saturated with water”. Assuming that is the operative definition of water, consider two premises:
(A) A single molecule of H2O is saturated with itself.
(B) A single molecule of H2O counts as water.
I’m inclined to accept (A) on the grounds that self-identity is a maximal saturation ‘relation’: for any X, X is maximally saturated with X.
I’m inclined to deny (B). I would think that something is water only if it has fluidity, etc. But it seems that a single H2O molecule doesn’t have fluidity; it seems that fluidity is a feature of a stuff or plurality.
However, if (A) and (B) are both true, then you get the interesting result that in every case, water is wet.
But on my view, (B) is false. So, only a plurality of two or more H2O molecules counts as water. However, the reasons in favor of (A) also favor (A*)
(A*): A plurality of H2O molecules is saturated with itself.
So, here’s my back of the napkin view: If the operative definition is right, then water is always wet.
Regarding "Fire is hot and makes things hot but fire burns things and is not itself burnt":
If I understand you right, you are admitting that fire is hot AND that it makes other things hot. So this is to allow that in some cases Fx (x is F) *and* x makes Fy (x makes something else F). So the mere fact that water makes (other) things wet is perfectly compatible with water also being wet. Anyhow, my point is that your view about fire (that fire is hot and makes things hot) seems to go against your view about water.
Parker: This is exactly what I was looking for haha, thanks so much. Okay so the two cases of fire open up the possibility for Fx & x makes Fy and (~Fx) & x makes Fy (since fire makes some things burnt but is not itself burnt.) So that doesn't solve it, got it.
I love that self-identity relation. Do you think that only applies to substances? If you apply it to modifier tropes does it still work? Or does it work for non-self-exemplifying properties like 'being two'? Seems like 'being two' isn't saturated with being two itself [Park Note: since the property ‘being two’ is just one property and not two], so maybe it's something like a self-reflexive relation of substances?
Robert Garcia: I was thinking of saturation mainly with reference to water, where saturation looks like some sort of parthood relation: to be saturated with water is to have parts that are water (like a sponge). So maximal saturation is akin to improper parthood: x is maximally saturated with x; x is an improper part of x.
But I’d want to stress that saturation is mainly (entirely?) a parthood relation and is not some sort of metaphysical/special ‘making’ relation. In particular it isn’t a character-making relation. So for a sphericity modifier trope S: I suppose you could say that S is maximally saturated with S, but that doesn’t ‘modify’ S and it certainly wouldn’t spherize S. It no more changes/modifies S than the fact that S is an improper part of S. In other words: Yes, S is an improper part of S, but there is nothing about (improper) parthood that entails that S thereby spherizes S. Regarding ‘being two’ (BT): BT is maximally saturated with BT, but that doesn’t make BT into the number two.
fin.
Okay, so there you have it! Yes, it got a little technical at the end, but this was a text convo between a Master’s level philosopher and an actual master of philosophy—Dr. Garcia is very good! I probably should have seen some more of this on my own, but I am a bit out of practice with trope theory and some of the phil. language and mereological stuff—time to bone back up.
[Park note: when you see something like this: Fx, it means that x (a given thing, a singular term) has property, F. This is the language of first order logic and it looks all math-y and scary—and it can be—but it’s really not so bad after all. To say x is F, is to predicate F-ness of x. You’re saying x is F where the ‘is’ (copula) is the ‘is of predication’ and not the ‘is of identity’. Superman is Clark Kent (is of identity), Superman is Strong (is of predication).]
So, is water wet? Yes. Is a single molecule of H2O wet? Well, a single molecule of water is saturated with itself but it probably doesn’t count as water all by itself, if you agree with Dr. Garcia. But, when you get two or more molecules of H2O then you’ve got yourself some water, and that water is saturated with water, and hence, is in fact wet (assuming you go in for that standard and plausible definition of wetness).
If you still disagree that water is wet, you now have a clearer target to attack. You can take issue with the definition of ‘wet’ used. You can pick on the maximal saturation relation for self-identity (for any X, X is maximally saturated with X), or maybe find some way to argue against (A*).
I hope you learned something and/or enjoyed that quick analysis. Big thanks to Dr. Robert Garcia for helping me think that through!
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“Moisture is the essence of wetness, and wetness is the essence of beauty.”- Derek Zoolander
Very interesting. As a layperson, I appreciate your practice of orienting philosophy toward those who are not trained. I got lost a bit in the text conversation, but I was able to understand the big-picture takeaway.