Why Would Anyone Think We Live in a Simulation?

Arguments For and Against Simulation Hypothesis

I’ve been fascinated by the Simulation Hypothesis in some form or another for as long as I can remember. In fact, my earliest childhood memory is watching Batman the Animated Series episode “Perchance to Dream” with my dad and two brothers, wherein Batman is trying to decide if he’s living in a computer simulation or not and how to get out if so. Spoilers, he was and he got out, I got the moment he awakes from the simulation tattooed on my arm… so yeah, I’m interested in the simulation hypothesis, especially in ways to refute it.

(see my Batman the Animated Series Batman waking up outta the simulation on my left arm above)

In the latest Parker’s Pensées Podcast episode, I went out to the University of Notre Dame to talk with Dr. Brian Cutter about the Simulation Hypothesis since he’s a world class philosopher of mind who has thought deeply about whether or not we could be sims living in a virtual world.

We start with Brian helping to explain what exactly the simulation hypothesis is and why anyone might give it a serious hearing at all—there are some pretty subtle and interesting motives after all. Then I run through a bunch of objections that I’ve found while researching the philosophical side of the hypothesis for the past 8 or so years. We end by talking about my own proposed transcendental argument against the simulation hypothesis which I give in more detail in this post here. Ultimately, I don’t think Brian is convinced haha.

Please do watch the video here, and if not all of it, then watch like 10 – 12 minutes of it—I’m really hoping this video will be the one to talk the Parker’s Pensées Podcast to the next level and you watching a good chunk, leaving a like, and leaving a comment will definitely help the video succeed!

Here’s a list of most of the arguments I raised and Dr. Cutter knocked down:

1.     The Simulation Hypothesis is Unfalsifiable and/or Not Verifiable

i.e., the simulation hypothesis cannot be falsified nor verified. Even if we were living in a computer simulation, we couldn’t know, or things would look exactly like they do now, so the theory doesn’t add anything, it’s just an unnecessary addition, cannot be proven or disproven and thus can be dismissed. Nick Bostrom notes that any positive evidence that we are in fact living in a computer simulation can be explained by other base reality phenomena like mental disorders so anecdotal evidence seems to be ruled out: https://simulation-argument.com/faq/ see answer 5.

2.     Michael Huemer’s Bayesian Argument Against Brain-in-a-vat skepticism (and simulation hypothesis)

The more specific your theory becomes, the less probable it is. *Bayesian calculation* *Bayesian calculation* annnnd you’re probably not living in a computer simulation. For more on this one see my podcast episode on it with Dr. Mike Huemer and Dr. Nate Lauffer: Huemer and Lauffer contra Simulation Hypothesis

3.     Theism is Favored Because of Parsimony

Theism and Simulation Hypothesis explain the same phenomena but theism is a simpler, more parsimonious, hypothesis since it posits one level or reality and simulation hypothesis posits at least one more than theism. So, all things being equal, choose theism and reject simulation hypothesis.

4.     James Anderson’s Self-Defeat Argument against Bostrom’s Simulation Argument

Anderson has several objections to Bostrom’s version of the simulation argument and the simulation hypothesis based on it. The main self-defeat style argument runs like this: Bostrom motivates his argument by asking us to consider the technological development and scientific progress in our own history and then asks us to project that out into the future. Based on this projection, it seems reasonable to assume that we will be able to make computer simulations advanced enough to have simulated beings who have the same kinds of experiences that we ourselves have. If that’s the case, we could be sims ourselves in some other, more advanced civilization’s simulation. Anderson says “not so fast!”. You got us to that conclusion by reasoning about our own history. But if we do live in a computer simulation then our scientific progress is not veridical after all, it’s not real, base-reality progress, and so how could we reason from our fake, simulated history, back out to the base-reality, or whatever reality our simulators live in, at all? For a deeper take on this, see my podcast episode with Dr. James Anderson on it here: James Anderson on Parker's Pensées

5. Hilary Putnam’s Transcendental Argument Against Brain-in-a-vat skepticism (and Simulation Hypothesis by extension?)

This one is notoriously tricky but see this episode of Parker’s Pensées with Dr. Sandy Goldberg for a detailed explanation and also see Brian Cutter and I discuss it in the latest episode above: Dr. Sandy Goldberg on Hilary Putnam's Arg.

6.     Parker’s Transcendental Argument Against Simulation Hypothesis

I’ve been working on this one for a while, doesn’t mean it’s all that good. Here’s the argument:

(i) A necessary condition of being rational is that one (at least implicitly (or upon reflection?)) trusts their knowledge forming processes to reliably lead them to true beliefs.

(ii) If you come to believe that you live in a computer simulation, then you have a reason not to trust that your knowledge forming processes reliably lead you to true beliefs.

Therefore,

(iii) Conclusion: it is not rational to believe you’re living in a computer simulation (even if you are).

If you want to see how I motivate this arg. then check out my full Substack piece on it here