I am moving on to 4-6, but I will definitely be circling back to chapter 3. I think I understand the basics but I will spend more time breaking these ideas down.
I've had to come back so often to make sure it actually says what I think it does. Lots of secondary sources read Lewis as arguing in different ways in this chapter. It's wild.
Thanks for making these ideas so clear. I noticed I’d highlighted the same passages in my own reading, but your article really helped me see the glow of the arguments which is most critical. On my own, I only had a vague sense of the discussion—it’s your writing that brings it into focus.
I do have a question, though: couldn’t the ‘randomness’ we observe in quantum inference simply be the inherent nature of the system? Why do we need to rationalise or account for this randomness, rather than just accepting it as part of the system’s basic entropy or maybe even an unintelligible event that sets the chain of rational events? is there any flaw in this argument?
"the glow of the arguments" is such a great line! As for the randomness, CSL's point is that if there is randomness, true randomness and not just our epistemic failure to observe the true underlying rules, then the Naturalist's claim that the universe is causally closed to super- or sub- natural causes by interlocking physical causes is false. There are things which aren't described by the laws of physics in the Naturalist's worldview if there's that quantum indeterminacy at the bottom level. I think today's naturalists may not care about this point as much but those in Lewis's day would have be bothered.
Oh boy that was a tricky chapter to read and comprehend. I really appreciate you acknowledging how tricky it was, made me feel a lot better. Your final paragraph comes it up well, I think I got lost in the detail of the arguments and ended up completely lost. But you highlighting the overall argument for reason got me to where I need to be in the end! Keep up the work Parker, looking forward to the easier reading.
I'm so glad! This kind of reasoning is a specific flavor and hits a certain kind of person. Some people, much smarter than me, just don't like it or just don't get it based on the way they naturally think, just as I don't fully get some of the stuff they think is so simple. I've come to realize this and it's made things so much easier for me. We just think differently, it's not always about smarts or something.
Wow thank you for this one. It was a tough chapter. I felt like I simultaneously understood it all and a complete dunce for fooling myself into thinking I understood any of it. Turns out, I wasn’t far off from understanding but also needed a lot more clarity in thought. I’m going to be rereading this one later.
In an essay in the God In The Dock collection called "Before We Can Communicate," Lewis wrote, "If, given patience and ordinary skill, you cannot explain a thing to any sensible person whatever (provide he will listen), then you don't really understand it yourself." That Lewis is so good at explaining difficult concepts to his readers is remarkable especially when it comes to very abstract and nonintuitive ideas like "The Argument From Reason" in this chapter of Miracles. I appreciate you taking the time and effort to help us "sensible persons" to further understand this argument and its philosophical origins.
You mentioned Alvin Plantinga in your discussion. I found his "Where The Conflict Really Lies" to be a fairly readable account of several of the ideas Lewis explores here. Reading this chapter has inspired me to reread Plantinga's book.
I look forward to your supplemental essay on Lewis's debate with Anscombe. The importance of that debate on Lewis's change in direction from pure apologetics to storytelling (Narnia Chronicles) is, as I'm sure you know, a hot topic among Lewis scholars.
Yes, that whole Anscombe debate mythos is so fascinating. I have no idea how it could have ballooned up so big when her essay was published for everyone to read haha.
Hey! Thanks. Please consider giving chapter 3 a week on its own. I gave up completely on the schedule after only managing to read thoroughly and make annotations on half of chapter 3 this week, not to mention the other 3 chapters I would have to do the same with in the next couple of days. 😢
Ch. 3 is crazy but 4-6 aren't nearly as difficult. And then you'll have all over next week until the 21st to get caught up on the next chapters. You don't have to have the readings done before the essay drops you can actually use that whole week to read and read the essay before the next one comes out. But I get it this stuff is really really tricky. I can't wait till we're through ch. 6 because it gets more manageable and really fun too
Boy, you read ahead to chapter 9 and go on a week long vacation and think you’ll be okay to not bring your book or notebook. Wrong! I’m super behind now! (At least on the commentary)
This chapter took me a long time to read the first time through. But it helped me understand some things I’ve seen before in the apologetics sphere.
I’ll make comments which are largely piecemeal. In part due to the difficulty of this chapter. In another for expediency as I am now behind!
The main claim to anchor us is “ if naturalism is true, every finite thing or event must be explicable in terms of the total system”
I like that CSL gives grace for a “gap” argument. Saying in essence that we shouldn’t expect the naturalist to be able to explain every possible phenomenon, but merely that it may be possibly explained using naturalism. How often is this luxury afforded to a Christian in debate? Instead it is a “god of the gaps” argument and dismissed.
A thought/ question I had based on the main claim is this: does the existence of abstracts derail naturalism immediately? Numbers, thoughts, etc. Maybe the abstract are justifiable as representations of qualities in the real or natural world e.g. three trees, one felled by a storm, three minus one equals two trees, to explain the abstract of numbers or math. please check me if I’m totally out of bounds here.
His first argument, the one on quantum indeterminacy I largely disregard as he himself says “I cannot help thinking they mean no more than that the movements of individual units are permanently incalculable to us , not that they are in themselves random and lawless.” As I have no great knowledge in physics, I leave this one behind to more intelligent people than myself.
CSL‘s ground consequent argument I find much more interesting. This is also where I think I finally understood what some apologist and philosophers like William Lane Craig mean when they ask an atheist or naturalist how they ground morality if naturalism is true.
The examples that CSL provides of cause-and-effect versus ground and consequent when he’s reading them seem to me to be a simple conversion, or switching the subject with the predicate. Am I wrong here?Although the definition is clear enough, the distinction in reality appears dubious and like it would be difficult to discern in a case by case basis
In my book page 25 to 26 if events are not true or false, then they must form a necessary part of what is true via connection with thought, e.g. the correspondence theory of truth.
Parker in your essay the section on evolution:
“…say “it is incontestable that we do in fact reach truths by inferences”[19] though, to which Lewis responses: “Certainly”. The argument is that if Naturalism were true, naturalistic evolution wouldn’t produce the cognitive faculties we take ourselves to have, faculties which allow us to reason well and find truth and gain knowledge with logical inference, so Naturalism can’t be true if we’re able to reason.” Might the argument from a naturalist perspective be thus, though we can reason we are very poor at it. It comes only with significant mental effort, and we are easily swayed by bias and fall into fallacy. In short is not CSL‘s claim of being unable reason with a Naturalist view, a universal negative,be too strong claim?
I don't think you're out of bounds on the naturalist reduction of abstracta to physical objects or mere abstractions in our heads. I feel the same way about the quantum argument haha but I like that he tosses it out there just in case it turns out to be true then it may be a potential wrench in their system.
I don't think that reply on behalf of the Naturalist in your last paragraph works because it assumes that, even though we are bad at reasoning, we can be good at it and trust our reasoning with significant mental effort, the argument by Lewis would imply that we couldn't trust our reasoning to lead us to truth whatsoever. If survival of the fittest is the guiding principle that built our cognitive faculties, our cognitive faculties would be aimed at producing beliefs that aid in our survival, but not necessarily the truth. So if you believe that your reasoning faculties were designed by a non-rational process and for survival, why would you take the product of those reasoning faculties to be 'true' and not 'biologically advantageous'. <Naturalism is true> should be substituted with <Naturalism is a belief that helps me survive, be it true or otherwise.
I am moving on to 4-6, but I will definitely be circling back to chapter 3. I think I understand the basics but I will spend more time breaking these ideas down.
I've had to come back so often to make sure it actually says what I think it does. Lots of secondary sources read Lewis as arguing in different ways in this chapter. It's wild.
Thanks for making these ideas so clear. I noticed I’d highlighted the same passages in my own reading, but your article really helped me see the glow of the arguments which is most critical. On my own, I only had a vague sense of the discussion—it’s your writing that brings it into focus.
I do have a question, though: couldn’t the ‘randomness’ we observe in quantum inference simply be the inherent nature of the system? Why do we need to rationalise or account for this randomness, rather than just accepting it as part of the system’s basic entropy or maybe even an unintelligible event that sets the chain of rational events? is there any flaw in this argument?
"the glow of the arguments" is such a great line! As for the randomness, CSL's point is that if there is randomness, true randomness and not just our epistemic failure to observe the true underlying rules, then the Naturalist's claim that the universe is causally closed to super- or sub- natural causes by interlocking physical causes is false. There are things which aren't described by the laws of physics in the Naturalist's worldview if there's that quantum indeterminacy at the bottom level. I think today's naturalists may not care about this point as much but those in Lewis's day would have be bothered.
Oh boy that was a tricky chapter to read and comprehend. I really appreciate you acknowledging how tricky it was, made me feel a lot better. Your final paragraph comes it up well, I think I got lost in the detail of the arguments and ended up completely lost. But you highlighting the overall argument for reason got me to where I need to be in the end! Keep up the work Parker, looking forward to the easier reading.
I'm so glad! This kind of reasoning is a specific flavor and hits a certain kind of person. Some people, much smarter than me, just don't like it or just don't get it based on the way they naturally think, just as I don't fully get some of the stuff they think is so simple. I've come to realize this and it's made things so much easier for me. We just think differently, it's not always about smarts or something.
This was a great chapter and your companion essay really did help to understand some of what CSL was saying.
I'm so glad! I was nervous that I was further complicating things. Thanks for this.
Wow thank you for this one. It was a tough chapter. I felt like I simultaneously understood it all and a complete dunce for fooling myself into thinking I understood any of it. Turns out, I wasn’t far off from understanding but also needed a lot more clarity in thought. I’m going to be rereading this one later.
I've felt this one like 10 times when it comes to this chapter haha!
In an essay in the God In The Dock collection called "Before We Can Communicate," Lewis wrote, "If, given patience and ordinary skill, you cannot explain a thing to any sensible person whatever (provide he will listen), then you don't really understand it yourself." That Lewis is so good at explaining difficult concepts to his readers is remarkable especially when it comes to very abstract and nonintuitive ideas like "The Argument From Reason" in this chapter of Miracles. I appreciate you taking the time and effort to help us "sensible persons" to further understand this argument and its philosophical origins.
You mentioned Alvin Plantinga in your discussion. I found his "Where The Conflict Really Lies" to be a fairly readable account of several of the ideas Lewis explores here. Reading this chapter has inspired me to reread Plantinga's book.
I look forward to your supplemental essay on Lewis's debate with Anscombe. The importance of that debate on Lewis's change in direction from pure apologetics to storytelling (Narnia Chronicles) is, as I'm sure you know, a hot topic among Lewis scholars.
Also, thanks for the links to further reading.
Thanks Lee!
Yes, that whole Anscombe debate mythos is so fascinating. I have no idea how it could have ballooned up so big when her essay was published for everyone to read haha.
Hey! Thanks. Please consider giving chapter 3 a week on its own. I gave up completely on the schedule after only managing to read thoroughly and make annotations on half of chapter 3 this week, not to mention the other 3 chapters I would have to do the same with in the next couple of days. 😢
Ch. 3 is crazy but 4-6 aren't nearly as difficult. And then you'll have all over next week until the 21st to get caught up on the next chapters. You don't have to have the readings done before the essay drops you can actually use that whole week to read and read the essay before the next one comes out. But I get it this stuff is really really tricky. I can't wait till we're through ch. 6 because it gets more manageable and really fun too
Boy, you read ahead to chapter 9 and go on a week long vacation and think you’ll be okay to not bring your book or notebook. Wrong! I’m super behind now! (At least on the commentary)
This chapter took me a long time to read the first time through. But it helped me understand some things I’ve seen before in the apologetics sphere.
I’ll make comments which are largely piecemeal. In part due to the difficulty of this chapter. In another for expediency as I am now behind!
The main claim to anchor us is “ if naturalism is true, every finite thing or event must be explicable in terms of the total system”
I like that CSL gives grace for a “gap” argument. Saying in essence that we shouldn’t expect the naturalist to be able to explain every possible phenomenon, but merely that it may be possibly explained using naturalism. How often is this luxury afforded to a Christian in debate? Instead it is a “god of the gaps” argument and dismissed.
A thought/ question I had based on the main claim is this: does the existence of abstracts derail naturalism immediately? Numbers, thoughts, etc. Maybe the abstract are justifiable as representations of qualities in the real or natural world e.g. three trees, one felled by a storm, three minus one equals two trees, to explain the abstract of numbers or math. please check me if I’m totally out of bounds here.
His first argument, the one on quantum indeterminacy I largely disregard as he himself says “I cannot help thinking they mean no more than that the movements of individual units are permanently incalculable to us , not that they are in themselves random and lawless.” As I have no great knowledge in physics, I leave this one behind to more intelligent people than myself.
CSL‘s ground consequent argument I find much more interesting. This is also where I think I finally understood what some apologist and philosophers like William Lane Craig mean when they ask an atheist or naturalist how they ground morality if naturalism is true.
The examples that CSL provides of cause-and-effect versus ground and consequent when he’s reading them seem to me to be a simple conversion, or switching the subject with the predicate. Am I wrong here?Although the definition is clear enough, the distinction in reality appears dubious and like it would be difficult to discern in a case by case basis
In my book page 25 to 26 if events are not true or false, then they must form a necessary part of what is true via connection with thought, e.g. the correspondence theory of truth.
Parker in your essay the section on evolution:
“…say “it is incontestable that we do in fact reach truths by inferences”[19] though, to which Lewis responses: “Certainly”. The argument is that if Naturalism were true, naturalistic evolution wouldn’t produce the cognitive faculties we take ourselves to have, faculties which allow us to reason well and find truth and gain knowledge with logical inference, so Naturalism can’t be true if we’re able to reason.” Might the argument from a naturalist perspective be thus, though we can reason we are very poor at it. It comes only with significant mental effort, and we are easily swayed by bias and fall into fallacy. In short is not CSL‘s claim of being unable reason with a Naturalist view, a universal negative,be too strong claim?
I don't think you're out of bounds on the naturalist reduction of abstracta to physical objects or mere abstractions in our heads. I feel the same way about the quantum argument haha but I like that he tosses it out there just in case it turns out to be true then it may be a potential wrench in their system.
I don't think that reply on behalf of the Naturalist in your last paragraph works because it assumes that, even though we are bad at reasoning, we can be good at it and trust our reasoning with significant mental effort, the argument by Lewis would imply that we couldn't trust our reasoning to lead us to truth whatsoever. If survival of the fittest is the guiding principle that built our cognitive faculties, our cognitive faculties would be aimed at producing beliefs that aid in our survival, but not necessarily the truth. So if you believe that your reasoning faculties were designed by a non-rational process and for survival, why would you take the product of those reasoning faculties to be 'true' and not 'biologically advantageous'. <Naturalism is true> should be substituted with <Naturalism is a belief that helps me survive, be it true or otherwise.